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Reservation Price as a Range: 
An Incentive Compatible Measurement Approach 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing on the literature on buyers’ uncertainty in preference and product knowledge, the 
authors make, and empirically test, the proposition that an individual consumer’s reservation 
price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single 
point.  Given this conceptualization, they propose an approach for incentive compatible 
elicitation of an individual’s reservation price range (ICERANGE) that builds on the Becker, 
DeGroot, and Marschak (BDM, 1964) point-of-purchase method.  Two empirical applications of 
the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to 
current methodologies for reservation price elicitation.  Results demonstrate that the proposed 
method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity, 
while yielding valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation.  
Key Words: Pricing; Measurement; Reservation Price; Valuation; Willingness to Pay 
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Reservation price is a well-known and widely invoked economic concept (cf. Varian 1992).  
In common parlance, a consumer’s reservation price represents the maximum price s/he is 
willing to pay for one unit of a good or service.  Value pricing, product design, negotiations and 
bundling are some substantive areas that depend on understanding the reservation prices of 
individual consumers.  
While the concept of reservation price has appeared in the economics literature for well over 
a century (e.g., Davenport 1902), there is growing interest in advancing the understanding and 
measurement of the construct, particularly in marketing (Chung and Rao 2003; Jedidi, Jagpal, 
and Manchanda 2003; Jedidi and Zhang 2002; Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  We attribute this 
interest to three factors.  First, the advent of e-commerce has paved the way for mass 
customization and personalized pricing in several industries (Choudhary et al. 2005), motivating 
accurate individual- level reservation price measurement.  Second, marketing researchers are 
applying recent methodological advances in such areas as experimental economics and Bayesian 
statistics to the measurement of reservation prices.  Third, there is a lack of consensus on the 
“right” way of measuring (and, we contend, even defining) a consumer’s reservation price that 
has left open avenues for further research.  These factors, especially the third, provide the 
motivation for our study. 
Consider, for illustration, the following definitions of reservation price (italics added): 
(a) “The minimum price at which [a consumer] would no longer purchase the [product]” 
(Hauser and Urban 1986, p. 449); 
(b) “The price at which a consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying the 
product” (Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar 1997, p. 265); and 
(c) “The price at or below which a consumer will demand one unit of the good” (Varian 
1992, p. 152). 
These three definitions differ from each other in the sense that in each case the reservation price 
maps on to a different propensity to buy on the part of the consumer.  They converge only if the 
  154 
consumer’s propensity to buy transitions from a definite yes to a definite no at a single price 
point rather than over a range of values. 
We propose that it is more reasonable to conceptualize an individual consumer’s reservation 
price as a range, with each of the above definitions representing specific supports within the 
range.  As discussed in the next section, the literature on consumers’ preference uncertainty (e.g., 
Fischer, Luce, and Jia 2000) and performance/quality uncertainty (e.g., Rust et al. 1999) lends 
theoretical support for this proposition.  If a consumer’s reservation price for a particular product 
is a range tied to the probability of purchase rather than a point, then the seller’s best price for the 
consumer depends on this range and its mapping onto purchase probability.  Stated differently, 
ignoring the range in an individual consumer’s reservation price when it exists is likely to lead to 
problems such as suboptimal pricing. 
The primary contribution of our study is methodological.  We propose an approach called 
ICERANGE – short for incentive compatible elicitation of the range in a consumer’s reservation 
prices.  Our approach, tied to actual choice and motivated by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak’s 
(hereinafter BDM, 1964) point-of-purchase methodology, is the first in the literature to measure 
individuals’ reservation prices as a range.  The range measurement is significant because the 
theory of uncertainty and related literature in experimental economics (and other areas) 
underscore that the point representation of reservation price is tenuous.  The range 
characterization retains the point measure as a special case.  We demonstrate that ICERANGE 
performs better than multiple benchmarks in two studies where subjects (college students) had 
the opportunity to actually buy the product (Belgian chocolate in one study and Australian wine 
in the other).  The two studies confirm the existence of the reservation price range.  Further, data 
from the more elaborate chocolate study support our premise that individuals’ reservation price 
ranges are positively related to their respective levels of performance- and preference-related 
uncertainty.  While the elicitation procedure for ICERANGE is somewhat more involved than 
that for BDM, we address possible concerns on this count.   
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We elaborate on the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of our range characterization 
in the next section.  We then compare and contrast alternative routes to reservation price 
measurement, and draw on this discussion to propose ICERANGE.  In the two subsequent 
sections we describe the applications in the chocolate and wine categories.  Our concluding 
section outlines the scope and implications of ICERANGE, as well as the study’s limitations and 
future research directions.  
CONCEPTUALIZING RESERVATION PRICE AS A RANGE 
We first review the alternative definitions of reservation price and cite theoretical support for 
our contention that the construct is better represented as a range of valuations.  Establishing these 
bases for the range is an essential prerequisite for motivating the ICERANGE approach. 
Review and Synthesis of Extant Definitions 
The basic idea of reservation price is that there exists a maximum price a consumer would be 
prepared to pay for one unit of a product (or service).  Thus the reservation price represents a 
consumer’s value threshold.  Her propensity to buy depends on whether the actual price is above, 
below or equal to this threshold.  As in much of the extant literature, we will use the term 
“willingness to pay” interchangeably with reservation price.  
The economics literature interprets reservation price as the combined economic value to a 
consumer of all the benefits that would accrue from the product (Ryan and Miguel 2000).  To 
marketers, the reservation price represents “an indirect measure of utility” (Hauser and Urban 
1986) or “a direct monetary measure of product value” (Kalish and Nelson 1991). 
One commonality among the three definitions of reservation price cited in the preceding 
section from Hauser and Urban (1986), Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar (1997), and Varian 
(1992) is that they link – at least implicitly – the definition to the consumer’s probability of 
purchase at a particular price point.  The difference lies in the implied purchase probability: 0% 
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in Urban and Hauser’s definition, 50% in Moorthy et al.’s, and 100% in Varian’s.  The lack of 
consensus goes beyond these three stud ies.7   
In our conceptualization, a consumer’s reservation price is explicitly tied to his/her 
probability of purchasing the good.  Based on the implied probability of purchase in current 
definitions, we identify the following three significant reservation price points: 
(a) Floor Reservation Price, the maximum price at or below which a consumer will definitely 
buy one unit of the product (i.e., 100% purchase probability);  
(b) Indifference Reservation Price, the maximum price at which a consumer is indifferent 
between buying and not buying (i.e., 50% purchase probability); and  
(c) Ceiling Reservation Price, the minimum price at or above which a consumer will 
definitely not buy the product (i.e., 0% purchase probability). 
Our motivation for the range representation comes from the uncertainty literature and related 
work in experimental economics (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003), resource 
economics (e.g., Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic 1993), psychology (e.g., Jacowitz and 
Kahneman 1995) and marketing (e.g., Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989).  This range 
conceptualization seems able to unify the various definitions of reservation price (as a range of 
thresholds).  We note that utility theory has axiomatically treated reservation price as a single 
point measure, under the assumption that subjects know their preference structures with certainty 
(thus, there may be uncertainty related to product performance, but not to one’s preference 
structure).  Our conceptualization allows for both sources of uncertainty.  We next examine the 
theoretical bases for this conceptualization. 
Theoretical Underpinnings for Reservation Price as a Range 
The single-point representation of reservation price requires the central assumption that a 
consumer knows with certainty how much she would be willing to pay for one unit of the 
                                                 
7  For example, the implied purchase probability is 100% in Kristensen & Garling’s (1997) definition of reservation 
price, 50% in the definitions of Casey and Delquie (1995) and Jedidi and Zhang (2002), and 0% in Scherer’s (1980). 
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product (cf. Hanemann 1984).  This is a strong assumption because consumers may lack a well-
defined preference structure or the cognitive ability to make such an assessment (Heiner 1985; 
Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic 1993), except perhaps in the most familiar contexts (Fischhoff 
1991). 
On the other hand, the vast literature on consumers’ uncertainty – about product performance 
and individual preference – underscores that neither type of uncertainty is ever fully resolved in 
practice (Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989).  Simon’s seminal theory of bounded rationality 
(Simon 1955) – that individuals have limited capacity for processing information - guides the 
work in this area.   
Buyers’ product performance uncertainty is due to imperfect information about the product’s 
quality or future performance.  While decision making under imperfect information demands 
greater cognitive resources (Shugan 1980), the nature and extent of the search is constrained by 
many factors such as search cost and experience (e.g., Stigler 1961; Ratchford 1982; Wathieu 
and Bertini 2005) and the individual’s ability to do so (Simon 1955).  In the presence of 
uncertainty, consumers consider not only the average (or expected) outcome but rather the entire 
range (Rust et al. 1999). 
Consumer’s preference uncertainty, also referred to in the literature as choice uncertainty 
(e.g., Urbany et al. 1989), is the ambiguity the consumer has over what exactly s/he wants (cf. 
Luce 1959; March 1978), making the consumer unsure of “what value to assign to the 
alternative” (Fischer, Luce, and Jia 2000, p. 88).  Even when the consumer has perfect 
information about a product, she may still be uncertain about her own preference (March 1978).  
Parallel work in agricultural economics draws on “ambivalence” (cf. Ready, Whitehead, and 
Blomquist 1995) as when individuals make “difficult tradeoffs.”  Opaluch and Segerson (1989) 
point out that the cost of overcoming ambivalence may be prohibitively high.  Preference 
uncertainty may be attributed to various sources.  For example, preferences may be constructive 
(Bettman, Johnson, and Payne 1990; Gregory and Slovic 1997), the choice situation may be 
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novel or unfamiliar (March 1978), or there may exist attribute conflict within a single alternative 
when it is good in some respects but bad in others (Fischer, Luce, and Jia 2000).  When an 
individual’s preferences are uncertain, Dubourg et al. (1997) argue in favor of a “personal 
confidence interval” of the individual’s willingness to pay.  
In a related vein, experimental economists argue for a threshold price up to which a 
consumer definitely buys the product, another threshold above which the consumer simply walks 
away, and a range of prices in which consumer response is more ambiguous (cf. Ariely et al. 
2003, p. 77).  Loomes (1988) finds that people have regions of indifference instead of clearly 
defined indifference curves.  The interval idea of the above studies is also seen in Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995) and Luce, Jia, and Fischer (2003, p. 466).  Recognizing the individual level 
distribution, Li and Mattsson (1995) propose eliciting a “post-decisional confidence measure” 
(i.e., a “subjective probability” measure) between 0% and 100% tied to reservation price 
elicitation.  Hanemann (1984) notes that an individual- level value distribution, “though not 
strictly consistent with utility theory,” fits empirical data better.   
Taken together, the above evidence, drawn from diverse domains, lends strong theoretical 
support to the notion of reservation price as a range rather than a single value.  Our 
conceptualization formalizes this idea by specifically mapping this range into purchase 
probabilities, in a choice context. 
THE ICERANGE PROCEDURE 
Our primary objective is to propose a new individual- level reservation price measurement 
approach that captures an individual’s reservation price as a range, tied to the probability of 
purchase.  To motivate our approach, we first review the extant approaches for reservation price 
measurement.  Beyond the methodological differences and framing distinctions, these 
approaches differ in the types of biases that they ignore or control for, and the purchase 
probabilities that the estimates map on to.  We position ICERANGE as a “better” alternative for 
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measuring individual- level reservation price, as it controls for at least two key biases and is able 
to capture reservation price as a range.  We briefly discuss the principal extant approaches, and 
then present ICERANGE.  Empirical demonstration of the superior performance of ICERANGE 
(along with evidence supporting the existence of a reservation price range) is presented in the 
following two sections. 
A Comparison of Extant Approaches for Reservation Price Measurement  
We review three prominent direct elicitation methods for reservation price measurement at 
the individual level: direct self-explication (e.g., Park and Srinivasan 1994), Vickrey auction 
(e.g., Vickrey 1961; Hoffman et al. 1993), and Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak’s (BDM, 1964) 
point-of-purchase procedure (e.g., Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  For completeness, we also 
consider the main indirect estimation methods: conjoint analysis (e.g., Kohli and Mahajan 1991; 
Jedidi and Zhang 2002) and choice experiment and related hybrids (e.g., Chung and Rao 2003).  
Our empirical applications, using chocolate and wine as the product categories, focus on direct 
elicitation methods: given the hedonic nature of both products, the conjoint-based indirect 
estimation methods would not be appropriate.  Extant studies point to differences in estimates 
across methods.  These may be attributable to a combination of factors such as the differences in 
the purchase probabilities that the methods map on to, the biases that the methods ignore or 
overcome, semantic differences among elicitation measures, and measurement error.   
Two important types of biases examined in the reservation price literature arise from the 
absence of incentive compatibility in elicitation owing to the hypothetical nature of the responses 
and from the tendency of respondents to act strategically.  These biases, discussed below, could 
lead to overbidding or underestimation of reservation price. 
The first is the absence of incentive compatibility on account of hypothetical response bias.8 
An incentive-compatible mechanism gives the respondent the incentive to respond truthfully 
                                                 
8 Hypothetical response bias (Nape et al. 2003) exists when values elicited in a hypothetical context, such as a 
survey, differ from those elicited in a real context, such as an actual purchasing situation.  The usual concern with 
this bias is that people will overstate their true valuation in hypothetical settings. 
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(Lusk and Schroeder 2004).  Incentive incompatibility arises, for example, when respondents are 
not responsible for paying their stated (or inferred) reservation price.  The willingness to pay is 
higher in such instances than when respondents are required to pay (Posavac 2001).  Cummings 
et al. (1995), among others, show that this upward bias extends to such other non- incentive-
compatible methods as open-ended and double-ended contingent valuation. 
The second type of bias is tied to strategic response.  This arises when respondents anticipate 
a link between their response and the ultimate outcome and act so “as to maximize their utility 
taking into account how their responses may affect the decision” (Carson, Groves, and Machina 
1999).  The direction of strategic response bias depends on the context of elicitation.  When 
consumers perceive that stating a higher reservation price will increase the likelihood of 
subsequently receiving a good, they are more likely to state a higher value than their true value 
(Posavac 2001, p. 95).  On the other hand, when anticipating a higher final price for a product, 
buyers might state a value lower than their true reservation price. 
While Vickrey auction is theoretically incentive compatible, there is some evidence in the 
literature that it induces overbidding (cf. Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987).  Simple self-
explication suffers from both kinds of biases (see Monroe 1990; Posavac 2001).  Unlike direct 
elicitation, indirect methods such as conjoint analysis and choice experiments avoid the 
increased attention to the pricing question and mitigate the effect of strategic bias.  These 
approaches are at best incentive neutral – they do not provide the respondent the (dis)incentive 
for (not) revealing the true willingness to pay.  We see the BDM approach as the “best” method 
among available options as it tackles the above sources of bias (Plott and Zeiler 2005).  BDM 
provides for incentive compatibility by rewarding respondents for telling the truth and penalizing 
them for lying (i.e., for over- or understating reservation prices).  It addresses strategic bias by 
making respondents aware that there is no link between their stated willingness to pay and the 
price they might have to pay during the enforcement phase of the procedure.   
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Another relevant issue is the probability of purchase that the reservation price measure (or 
estimate) implicitly maps on to.9  As BDM and Vickrey auction procedures are tied to real 
choice (i.e., one has to buy the good if certain conditions are met), respondents may be expected 
to provide a value corresponding to their floor reservation price with 100% purchase probability.  
On the other hand, the nature of trade-off analysis in conjoint analysis and choice experiments—
tied to indifference between buying and not buying—is likely to yield an estimate of reservation 
price close to the indifference reservation price, with 50% purchase probability.  To the extent 
that there is a range in an individual’s reservation prices, one can see the different approaches 
measuring distinct supports within the range.   
We position ICERANGE approach as one that is rooted in theory, and builds on the “best” 
characteristics of the BDM approach (e.g., Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  Our focus on 
incentive compatible elicitation (in actual buying situations), avoidance of strategic bias, and our 
choice of protocols resemble those of BDM (especially Wertenbroch and Skiera).  The core 
distinctions of our paper are that we draw on the theory of uncertainty to conceptualize 
individual reservation price as a range (in contrast to the point representation in BDM), and our 
ICERANGE approach captures this reservation price range with associated purchase 
probabilities.  As we will show later, ICERANGE predicts actual behavior better than BDM.10  
Specifics of the ICERANGE Procedure 
ICERANGE is tied to the point of purchase of the product of interest.  In the mold of Vickrey 
auction, BDM, and other direct elicitation methods, ICERANGE treats reservation thresholds as 
                                                 
9 For illustration, the Vickrey auction, under which the respondents submit independent sealed bids for a real 
product and the winning (i.e., highest) bidder pays the second highest price, arguably maps on to the floor 
reservation price (i.e., 100% probability of purchase).  This is because the winning bidder (potentially any one of the 
respondents) must purchase the product and the second bid could be only infinitesimally less than the highest bid.   
10 Our focus on ICERANGE distinguishes our study from Ariely et al. (2003) as well.  Unlike theirs, our primary 
contribution is methodological.  On the theoretical side, we build on Ariely et al.’s proposal for the existence of the 
reservation price range by drawing on the literature on uncertainty, and by linking specific supports within an 
individual’s range to his/her purchase probability.   
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deterministic.11  The elicitation of reservation price information is followed in quick succession 
by the “enforcement” phase during which a respondent is either required to buy one unit of the 
product at an incentive-compatible price or is denied the opportunity to purchase.  Respondents 
should not be paid any money for participation to avoid possible endowment effects (cf. Thaler 
1985).  The point-of-purchase elicitation means that, as in BDM, we are able to avoid the 
hypothetical response bias, by linking responses to real choice.   
The product (or brand) for which consumers’ reservation prices are being ascertained is not 
in short supply.  Thus, unlike in a Vickrey auction setting (say), the overbidding bias (cf. Kagel, 
Harstad, and Levin 1987) is avoided by not making product choice a “competition” to be won. 
To control against strategic response, respondents are informed that the seller has already set 
a price that is not disclosed to them.  As a guarantee that the price will not be changed during the 
reservation price elicitation, this price is written on an index card within a sealed envelope placed 
in front of the respondent.  In a slightly different vein, Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) tell each 
respondent that the transaction price would be the one that the respondent randomly picks from 
an urn.  Our use of the secret, pre-selected price in a sealed envelope follows Schade and 
Kunreuther (2001).  The price is revealed to the respondent at the end of the study. 
Ensuring incentive compatibility over a respondent’s entire range of reservation prices forms 
the crux of ICERANGE.  To achieve incentive compatibility we must ensure that the 
respondent’s dominant strategy is to tell the truth over the entire range of purchase probabilities.  
We clarify how we do so while outlining the elicitation steps. 
The respondent is given an opportunity to examine the product in factory packing and use (or 
taste) a demonstration piece to gain familiarity.  The elicitation involves three steps to capture 
the respondent’s floor, indifference, and ceiling reservation prices.12  The reservation price 
                                                 
11 Rooting reservation price measurement in a random utility framework is an alternative perspective, shared by 
indirect elicitation methods such as conjoint analysis and choice experiments. 
12 Alternatively, we could ask respondents for their purchase probabilities at various price points.  However, while 
both routes can be structured to avoid the strategic- and incentive incompatibility-bias, our approach is the more 
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elicitation questions are accompanied by graphical representations of the relationship between 
reservation price and purchase probability, so that the idea is clear and intuitive to respondents 
(the elicitation instrument in Figure 1 is described later).  Details of each step are as follows: 
Step 1: A respondent is asked to state the maximum price A at or below which s/he would 
definitely buy the product (i.e., 100% purchase probability, equivalent to the floor 
reservation price in our framework).  To ensure incentive compatibility, the respondent 
is told that if the price P (in the sealed envelope) is found at the end of the study to be 
less than or equal to the respondent’s stated price A, s/he would be required to purchase 
at price P.   
Step 2: The respondent is asked to reveal price level B at which s/he is indifferent between 
buying and not buying the product (i.e., 50% probability of purchase, corresponding to 
the indifference reservation price).  The respondent is informed that if the posted price P 
is later found to be equal to B, s/he has to pick a ball from an urn containing one green 
ball and one red ball.  If s/he picks the green ball, s/he would be required to buy at the 
price P.  If s/he picks the red ball, s/he would not have the opportunity to buy (Ellsberg 
1961).  That is, the respondent is made aware that P = B implies a draw from the urn 
with a 50% purchase probability. 
Step 3: Next, the respondent is asked to state price level C at which there is only a 10% (i.e., 
small) probability that s/he would purchase the product.  Because it is impossible to ask 
the respondent for an incentive compatible price level with a 0% purchase probability, 
we rely on the price with the 10% purchase probability to extrapolate the ceiling 
reservation price.  If the posted price P (in the sealed envelope) is later found to be equal 
to this price, the respondent would be asked to pick a ball from an urn containing one 
green and nine red balls.  The respondent is required to buy at the price P (or forgo 
purchase) if s/he picks a green (or red) ball.  That is, P = C implies a draw from the urn 
with a 10% purchase probability.  (As discussed later, we find from our applications of 
ICERANGE that we can approximate the ceiling reservation price by extrapolating 
                                                                                                                                                             
efficient, requiring a small, fixed, number of elicitation questions, given that the task is to elicit specific supports in 
the RP range corresponding to specific purchase probabilities (e.g., 0, 50, and 100%).  In contrast, the alternative 
approach would be more of an open-ended “trial and error” process, likely requiring several questions. 
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through the 100% and 50% purchase probability points, with no significant loss in 
predictive ability.  Thus, to simplify the approach, Step 3 may be eliminated)13 
Our approach of operationalizing uncertainty by asking respondents to pick up a ball from an 
urn is supported by earlier studies (cf. Elliott and McKee 1995; Ellsberg 1961).  Grether and 
Plott (1979) take a slightly different route in which a random dart is thrown at a circle; the 
respondent “wins” if the dart hits a small shaded area within the circle.  Novemsky and 
Kahneman (2005) point to the conceptual similarity between uncertain buying situations and a 
game of poker.  
Two additional clarifications are provided.  First, if the respondent states the same 
reservation price for two or more successive elicitations, then the enforcement decision (buy or 
forgo) is tied to the higher probability if the sealed price P equals the tied reservation prices.  In 
other words, a respondent cannot strategically lower his/her probability of purchase by keeping 
multiple reservation price levels the same.  Second, as the sealed price P might fall between a 
respondent’s A and B levels (or between B and C, and so on), the respondent is shown 
graphically the interpolation rule that would apply if the sealed price P were to fall between Xa 
and Xb, the levels corresponding to a% and b% probability levels (b  > a).  In this case, s/he 
would be asked to pick a ball from an urn corresponding to a probability of purchase equal to 
%)X(XP)a)(X(ßa ßaa ---+ .  For illustration, let a and b  correspond to purchase 
probabilities of 50% and 100%.  Suppose the sealed price P (in the envelope) is between X100 
and X50 (X50 > X100).  The purchase probability at price level P (based on the interpolation rule) 
is %)X(XP)50)(X(10050 1005050 ---+ .  (Our verbal protocol is discussed later.) 
Are these steps adequate to ensure that the respondent answers truthfully?  Under the 
ICERANGE approach, the respondents’ dominant strategy is to offer their true reservation price 
                                                 
13 Two optional Steps 4 and 5 that elicit the RP’s D and E corresponding to the 75% and 25% purchase probabilities 
may be added if the researcher wishes to calibrate the response curve more accurately and if the respondents are 
deemed to have the time and resources to provide these values.  The procedure to elicit D and E: If the sealed price 
P matches D (or E), the respondent picks a ball from an urn containing three green balls and one red ball (or one 
green and three red balls).  The respondent is required to buy (or forgo purchase) if s/he picks a green (or red) ball. 
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for any corresponding purchase probability of c% (0 = c = 100).  Since respondents have to 
indicate price levels X tied to their purchase probabilities c%, not revealing the “true” levels 
hurts the respondent.  Specifically, under(over)estimating the true reservation price 
corresponding to a given purchase probability means that it is possible that the respondent has a 
less(more)-than- ideal chance of being able to purchase the product at the revealed price.  In other 
words, incentive compatibility is maintained over the entire range. 
Once the elicitation is complete, the envelope is unsealed and the respondent is subjected to 
the appropriate outcome as per the instructions (which serve as the “contract”).  It follows from 
the above description that the BDM procedure is nested within ICERANGE; the two approaches 
converge when the range of an individual consumer’s reservation prices is zero. 
Link between Individual-level Reservation Price Range and Uncertainty 
We have earlier cited as motivation for our reservation price range conceptualization the 
effect of the consumer’s degree of uncertainty with product performance and the level of her 
own preference-related uncertainty toward the product.  Thus, we posit:  
· The higher an individual’s uncertainty with the product’s performance, the greater 
his/her range in reservation prices for the product. 
· The higher an individual’s preference uncertainty for the product, the greater his/her 
range in reservation prices for the product. 
APPLICATION OF ICERANGE: THE CHOCOLATE STUDY 
In this section, we report on the first of two studies employing different products, chocolate 
and wine.  The primary objectives of the two studies together are (i) to demonstrate the 
practicability of the ICERANGE approach and (ii) to benchmark ICERANGE’s performance 
relative to several alternative direct elicitation approaches, including BDM and Vickrey auction, 
for different products.  (As mentioned earlier, conjoint-based indirect estimation approaches 
would not be appropriate given the hedonic nature of the products involved in both studies – 
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chocolate and wine.)  In the process, we seek to confirm the existence of the range in individual-
level reservation prices, and test its relationship with the individual- level performance and 
preference uncertainties.   
The first study, described in this section, involves 562 undergraduate students at two major 
US universities and uses as the product a premium brand of Belgian chocolate, Galler.  The 
second study, discussed in the next section, uses a brand of Australian red wine, The Lucky 
Country, with 91 part-time MBA students from one of the above universities as respondents.  
Several earlier studies on consumers’ valuations have used chocolate (e.g., Bhatia and Fox-
Rushby 2003; Johannesson et al. 1997; Kaas and Ruprecht 2003) or wine (e.g., Horsky et al. 
2004; Lynch and Ariely 2000; Nerlove 1995) as the product category. 
Data Collection 
Galler retails in the US for $5.25 per 3.5 oz. bar at exclusive candy stores.  As the Galler 
brand is not available at most stores (in fact, none of our respondents had heard of the brand 
before), the influence of reference price effects on consumers’ reservation prices should be weak 
at best.  A salient feature of ICERANGE is its linkage to actual choice.  Imported chocolates as 
the product category also ensures that respondents are likely to be in the market14, thus reducing 
“wasted” responses (from respondents with no interest in purchasing the product at any 
reasonable price at the time of the study). 
We first collected the data for ICERANGE and BDM, randomly assigning 134 respondents 
to ICERANGE and 128 to BDM.  Then, to benchmark ICERANGE against additional methods, 
we went back to the same target population to randomly assign a fresh set of respondents to these 
methods – 104 to Vickrey auction, 54 to the self-explicated floor reservation price measure (cf. 
Varian 1992), 59 to the self-explicated indifference reservation price measure (cf. Moorthy et al. 
                                                 
14 Studies have shown that the typical gourmet chocolate consumers are “younger” 
(www.marketresearch.com/map/prod/112881.html) and that chocolate consumers are overrepresented in the 14-24 
age group (oldwww.roymorgan.com/pressreleases/19991/chocolate.html).  Moreover, although the retail price is at 
the high end of the range for chocolates, it is clearly affordable for college undergraduates. 
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1997), and the remaining 83 to a “general” self-explicated measure that does not state the 
purchase probability (cf. Park and Srinivasan 1994).  The greater number for Vickrey auction is 
because it is incentive-compatible, like ICERANGE.  Among the self-explicated measures, the 
“general” measure is the most commonly used and hence was assigned more respondents.   
The following steps are common to all methods.  All respondents were told a week in 
advance about the study on “consumers’ preferences for Galler chocolate.”  They were advised 
to come with about $10 in cash (i.e., well above the product’s price) as they would have an 
opportunity to buy the product.  Respondents were not paid to participate in any of the studies.  
We wanted to ensure that we did not create an endowment effect (cf. Thaler 1985) that might 
contaminate the reservation price elicitation.  Respondents earmarked for the incentive 
compatible methods – ICERANGE, BDM, and Vickrey auction – were specifically told that they 
might be required to purchase if the price was “acceptable” to them.  On a given study day, each 
respondent was asked to taste a piece of the chocolate and also examine an unopened bar.  No 
information about the product’s typical retail price was provided.  The data collection for all 
methods included an elicitation phase and a debriefing phase.  For the three incentive-compatible 
methods alone, there was an additional enforcement phase in which those respondents that were 
“required to buy” made the purchase.  We now discuss certain method-specific aspects of our 
data collection.  Figure 1 documents the protocol and measurement procedures for the various 
approaches. 
___________________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
___________________________ 
Panel 4 of the figure clarifies how we explained the measurements and implications of the 
intermediate purchase probabilities to the respondents, including the interpolation of the 
probability corresponding to the envelope price P. 
ICERANGE and BDM.  Data collection for these two approaches was via one-on-one 
interviews (akin to Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002, p. 231).  Respondents were randomly assigned 
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to either the ICERANGE or the BDM group.  They were alerted to the fact that their responses 
would be binding in terms of the ultimate purchase outcome, which depended on how their 
responses compared with the price inside a sealed envelope (placed in front of the respondent).  
The interviewers also explained to respondents why it would not be in their interest to over- or 
understate their valuations.  These interviewers (recruited from an undergraduate marketing 
research class) were carefully trained and required to undergo several practice rounds. 
In the elicitation phase, respondents in the BDM group only had to provide a single price 
representing their maximum willingness to pay for the product, with a follow-up option to revise 
their response (as in Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002) till they reached a price level they were not 
willing to pay.  Respondents in the ICERANGE group provided their floor, indifference, and 
ceiling reservation prices, following the procedure described in the previous section.  
ICERANGE respondents were also allowed to revise their floor reservation price estimates 
similar to those in Desaigues and Rabl (1995, on contingent valuation) and BDM (Wertenbroch 
and Skiera 2002).  The results presented are based on these revised reservation prices.  
Respondents were encouraged to review their responses before they were “locked in” by the 
interviewer.  The option to revise reservation prices is a desirable feature as it tackles anchoring 
problems, if any.  With ICERANGE, the review stage lets respondents re-look their entire range 
and not be constrained by their first two responses on floor and indifference levels.  The review 
offers respondents an added level of reassurance. 
The enforcement phase was structured to aid benchmarking.  To assess how well the 
respondents’ actual purchase decisions correspond to their self-explicated reservation prices, 
each respondent was asked to pick one of five index cards, with a different price level ($2.50, 
$2.75, $3.00, $3.25, and $3.50) printed on their backs (thus hidden from the respondent).  
Respondents were assured that all five index card prices were weakly lower than the price in the 
sealed envelope.  They were instructed to turn over the selected card to reveal the price, and then 
declare whether they would buy the chocolate at that price or not.  A respondent choosing to buy 
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paid the revealed price, received the chocolate, and completed the final debriefing phase of the 
study.  The unmasking of the envelope price has no practical significance for this respondent.  
For a respondent not choosing to buy at the price revealed on the index card (i.e., the special 
offer price), his/her stated valuations in the elicitation phase were binding.  Depending on how 
the unmasked envelope price stacked against his/her reservation price(s), s/he was required to 
buy or not buy based on the procedure discussed in the previous section.   
The debriefing phase sought feedback from respondents to benchmark ICERANGE against 
other approaches on qualitative dimensions.  We wanted to see if there are (dis)advantages with 
ICERANGE that go beyond predictive performance.  Accordingly, we surveyed respondents’ 
comfort level with each approach, its clarity of incentive compatibility and the comprehension 
(or understandability).  (Specific measures and results are in Table 2 and will be discussed later.)   
Vickrey auction.  Respondents were informed of the rules of the auction (see Figure 1(C)).  
Special attention was drawn to the rules that the bids would be final and binding, and that the 
winner (i.e., the highest bidder) would pay the second highest bid price.  They were told that the 
winner would be revealed in the following class.  Soon after, the respondents submitted their 
“sealed” bids for a bar of chocolate.  In the enforcement phase, and before unsealing their bids, 
the respondents were told of a special offer.  If they chose to buy the chocolate at this special 
price, their bids would be withdrawn from the auction and would no longer be binding.  The 
special price, predetermined from a pilot study, was then revealed.  Respondents who indicated 
that they would buy at the special price paid the money and collected a bar apiece.  The bids of 
those who chose not to buy at the special offer price were included in the auction.  All 
respondents then participated in the debriefing phase, following the same format as in 
ICERANGE or BDM. 
Self-explicated approaches.  The measures corresponding to the three different self-
explicated approaches relate to the floor, indifference, and general reservation prices (see Figure 
1(D)).  Respondents were randomly assigned to answer one of the three corresponding 
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instruments.  Under these approaches, respondents are asked directly to state their valuations, 
without corresponding precautions to maintain incentive compatibility and avoid strategic biases 
(i.e., the answers are not binding).  After respondents had turned in the questionnaires containing 
their reservation prices for a bar of chocolate, they were informed of a “special offer price” and 
asked if they wanted to buy the chocolate.  As before, this step aids benchmarking.  Those who 
said “yes” collected a bar each after paying the price.  The data collection ended with debriefing. 
Results 
___________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
___________________________ 
Table 1 contains the mean reservation price estimates (and associated standard errors) from 
ICERANGE and the five other approaches, and the shift in choice likelihood measures indicating 
predictive performance (discussed later).  The mean floor, indifference, and ceiling reservation 
prices (across respondents) from the ICERANGE approach for a bar of Galler chocolate are 
$2.97, $3.48 and $4.19 respectively.  The mean range (difference between floor and ceiling 
reservation prices) of $1.22 is significantly different from zero (t = 4.78; p < .01), supporting our 
range conceptualization.  Further, the mean indifference reservation price is significantly greater 
than the mean floor reservation price (t = 2.30, p < .05), as is the mean ceiling reservation price 
compared to the mean indifference reservation price (t = 2.58, p < .01).  106 of the 134 
respondents under ICERANGE characterized their reservation prices as a range rather than as a 
point15 (a range of $.50 or less was classified as a point, following Kagel and Levin 1993).  
For the BDM group, the mean reservation price is $2.94, while that under the Vickrey 
auction procedure is $3.14.  The self-explicated mean floor, indifference, and general reservation 
price estimates are $2.02, $2.71 and $2.39 respectively.  As anticipated, we find that BDM yields 
                                                 
15 Indeed, our approach does allow respondents to give the same values for all three reservation prices – that is, they 
could indicate a range of zero if they wish to.  In fact, 21% of the 134 respondents for the chocolate study indicated 
a range of $0.50 or less, demonstrating that respondents could and did exercise the option of indicating same or 
similar values for all three thresholds. 
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an estimate closer to the ICERANGE floor reservation price – indeed, they are not significantly 
different from each other (t = .14, p >.10).  At the same time, the BDM estimate is significantly 
lower than the indifference reservation price of ICERANGE (t = 2.33, p < .05). 
Comparisons of ICERANGE’s predictive performance with those of the other approaches are 
based on the data collected at the enforcement phase of the study.  At the individual level, we 
compared the observed (i.e., actual) choice for each respondent at the offer price with the 
predicted choice likelihood at that price from ICERANGE or alternative approach, as applicable 
for the individual.  Our specific measure of predictive performance is the shift in choice 
likelihood (cf. Inman et al. 1990), defined as SCLi = OCi – PCLi, where SCLi is the shift in 
choice likelihood for respondent i, OCi is the observed choice indicator, and PCLi is the choice 
likelihood predicted by the model, all for the ith respondent.   
OCi is one (or zero) if the respondent buys (or does not buy) at the special offer price.  PCLi 
from ICERANGE can be anywhere between 0 and 1.  Specifically, if the offer price is less (or 
greater) than or equal to the respondent’s floor (or ceiling) reservation price, then PCLi is one (or 
zero).  For any other offer price, PCLi equals the estimated purchase probability discussed 
earlier.  Under the other methods, PCLi is one (or zero) if the offer price = (or >) the 
respondent’s stated reservation price.  For any approach, a lower SCL (averaged over 
respondents) implies superior prediction.   
ICERANGE provides the best predictive performance with an SCL of .126.  Second in our 
application is BDM with an SCL of .180, followed by Vickrey auction (SCL = .307), self-
explicated floor (SCL = .315), self-explicated indifference (SCL = .337), and self-explicated 
general (SCL = .339).  The predictive performance of ICERANGE is significantly better than 
that of BDM (SCL difference = .054, p < .10) and each of the other approaches (p < .05). 
One could raise the issue that the SCL measure favors ICERANGE as this approach alone 
allows PCL (predicted choice likelihood) and SCL values anywhere between 0 and 1 for a given 
respondent.  With other methods, PCL and SCL values for any respondent are dichotomous – 0 
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or 1, representing the miss rate (= 1 – hit rate).  To address any concern that SCL might 
“handicap” the benchmark methods, we also computed the miss rate under ICERANGE.  To do 
so, we used the indifference price (50% purchase probability) as cut off point.  If the predicted 
purchase probability < 50% (or = 50%) under ICERANGE, the predicted choice is treated as 
“not buy” (or buy).  The miss rate for ICERANGE of .112 is significantly less than that of BDM 
(miss rate difference = .068, p < .10) and each of the other approaches (p < .05).  The results 
provide greater assurance for the use of ICERANGE.  We must emphasize however that SCL is 
the more appropriate measure of predictive performance. 
Table 2 reports the average respondent evaluations of the different methods on three 
dimensions, collected in the debriefing phase of the study.  Note that the superior performance of 
ICERANGE over BDM comes without sacrificing the comfort level of the respondents in 
answering the reservation price elicitation questions.  Further, there was no significant difference 
between the two methods in terms of the clarity of incentive compatibility, although respondents 
did appear to feel that the BDM method was easier to understand (the mean score of 3.85 for 
ICERANGE is significantly lower than that of 4.39 for BDM at p < .05). 
___________________________ 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
___________________________ 
Further, to test the postulates that an individual’s performance- and preference-related 
uncertainty are positively related to his/her reservation price range, we developed measures of 
performance- and preference-based uncertainty as follows (see Table 3 for details).  The six 
items were drawn from Urbany, Dickson, and Wilk ie (1989) and Cordell (1997).  Principal 
components analysis followed by Varimax rotation suggested two factors, corresponding to 
performance- and preference-related uncertainty, with reasonably strong convergent and 
discriminant validity.  We next ascertained the strength of association between respondents’ 
scores on each of these factors (as measures of performance and preference uncertainty) and their 
reservation price ranges as estimated by ICERANGE.  As predicted, we find that both preference 
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uncertainty and performance uncertainty have significant positive associations with individual 
ranges in reservation prices (correlation coefficients of .276 and .236 respectively, p < .05).   
THE WINE STUDY 
We conducted the second study with The Lucky Country brand of wine (a 55% Shiraz/45% 
Cabernet Sauvignon blend) from Australia, retailing at approximately $15.00 per 750 ml bottle, 
to replicate the performance of ICERANGE in a more expensive product category with “older” 
respondents, specifically, 91 part-time MBA students.  We focused on ICERANGE, BDM, and 
Vickrey auction – the top three approaches from the chocolate category, all providing for 
incentive compatibility (at least in theory).  The protocol was essentially similar to that for the 
chocolate study with one difference: in view of the respondents’ time constraints, we used a 
questionnaire-based survey methodology (in lieu of one-on-one interviews) to elicit respondents’ 
valuations.  This also allowed us to evaluate the relative performance of ICERANGE using the 
(quicker) survey-based approach, in contrast to the one-on-one interviews used in the wine study.  
The results are presented in Table 4. 
___________________________ 
Table 4 about here 
___________________________ 
Again, we find strong support for the superior predictive performance of ICERANGE, as 
measured by the shift in choice likelihood (SCL).  Specifically, ICERANGE (SCL = .08) 
significantly outperforms both BDM (SCL = .29) and Vickrey auction (SCL = .21) with p < .01 
and p < .05 respectively.  The SCL values of BDM and Vickrey auction are not significantly 
different from each other.  Confirming the range characterization, the mean observed “range” in 
reservation prices under ICERANGE of $ 4.92 is significantly higher than zero (p < .01).  
Further, we find that both performance- and preference-uncertainty are positively correlated 
(correlation coefficients of .05 and .12), although in this instance the coefficients are not 
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statistically significant, perhaps due to the relatively small sample size for ICERANGE in the 
wine study (and possibly greater measurement error under the survey format).  Finally, in this 
study, the feedback from respondents in the debriefing phase indicates no significant difference 
between ICERANGE and BDM in terms of respondents’ comfort levels, comprehension, or 
clarity with regard to incentive compatibility.  
Discussion 
Overall, the two studies demonstrate the practicality of the ICERANGE procedure, at least 
among college-going respondents.  Furthermore, we find strong support for the superior 
predictive ability of ICERANGE over multiple benchmarks.  It performs significantly better 
across two product categories and with undergraduates and MBA students.  Consistent with the 
conceptual framework, a respondent’s uncertainty leve ls – on product knowledge and personal 
preference – are positively related to his/her range in reservation prices.   
We see ICERANGE as an approach that integrates the BDM method with the theoretically 
and empirically supported idea of reservation price as a range of values on account of 
uncertainty, avoids strategic bias and incentive incompatibility bias, and most importantly, 
predicts choice significantly better than multiple extant methods across two categories.   
The wine application demonstrates that ICERANGE works well even under a survey format.  
Yet, if respondents and interviewers have the time, we would recommend personal interviews to 
make the process very transparent and (at least in theory) reduce measurement error. 
In an attempt to further simplify ICERANGE, we checked whether the reservation price 
elicitation tied to the 10% purchase probability level (arguably the hardest part of ICERANGE) 
could be extrapolated from the floor and indifference reservation price elicitations, instead of 
asking an additional question.  We find that the extrapolated reservation price for the 10% 
probability level is almost as good as the measured value for both chocolate ($4.19 actual vs. 
$4.17 extrapolated, p = .85) and wine ($16.62 actual vs. $17.32 extrapolated, p = .35).  
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Furthermore, SCL values based on extrapolations from the floor and indifferent reservation 
prices (i.e., not using the direct elicitations at the 10% probability level) exhibit no significant 
deterioration.  We suggest that when consumers are constrained in terms of time or cognitive 
resources, eliciting the floor (100% purchase probability) and indifference (50% purchase 
probability) reservation prices according to the ICERANGE format might suffice.   
CONCLUSION 
 A consumer’s reservation price for a product has traditionally been considered to be a single 
point.  However, the literature on consumers’ uncertainty – which posits that consumers are not 
often sure of their own preferences and the performance of the products they intend to purchase – 
suggests that the above assumption, while analytically convenient, is practically weak.  Against 
this backdrop, we have attempted a synthesis of the literature to propose a conceptualization of 
an individual’s reservation price as a range, tied to purchase probabilities.  Extrapolating from 
this research, we develop an incentive compatible elicitation procedure, ICERANGE, to measure 
the range in reservation prices at the level of individual consumers.  Two empirical applications 
in the chocolate and wine categories provide validation of the ICERANGE methodology. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Reservation price is a key construct in understanding and inferring consumer preference.  We 
see our study contributing to this literature stream in the following ways.  The primary 
contribution is methodological.  ICERANGE is the first study to measure reservation price as a 
range.  The (ICERANGE) approach is tied to real choice and guards against two common 
sources of bias.  The secondary contributions are theoretical and empirical.  Specifically, this 
study reconciles diverse definitions of reservation price with the range framework, and 
establishes a link between the individuals’ uncertainties and reservation price ranges.  The 
empirical contribution is from demonstrating the superior predictive performance of 
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ICERANGE, establishing the existence of the range in two different applications, and providing 
at least partial support for the link between the level of uncertainty and reservation price range. 
Managerial Contributions 
From a managerial perspective, we believe that ICERANGE holds promise as a practical 
methodology for reservation price measurement.  Our empirical study is encouraging in this 
regard, both in terms of its performance and its feasibility, notwithstanding the additional steps 
involved relative to the BDM approach.  Respondents stated that they were comfortable with the 
method and did not appear to find the additional questions difficult to understand or onerous. 
While our empirical study used personal interviews for the elicitation process, we realize that 
such personal interviewing may not always be feasible in real world applications.  With the 
objective of developing ICERANGE as a practical tool for reservation price elicitation, we have 
designed an interactive online version of the approach, with a user-friendly graphical interface.  
This online version has undergone an initial pilot test with MBA students (in the context of a 
consumer electronics product).  While the sample size is too small to draw any statistically 
significant conclusions, the online system worked smoothly, and respondents felt comfortable 
with it.  (Indeed, some of the participants felt that the idea of eliciting a complete range rather 
than just a single point, actually made respondents feel more comfortable with ICERANGE 
compared to BDM.)  The online interface has been posted on the second author’s website. 
As stated earlier, the ability to estimate individual consumers’ reservation price ranges with 
reasonable accuracy (and minimal systematic bias) is clearly valuable for managers making 
pricing decisions, particularly in a mass customization setting. 
Clarifying the Scope and Limitations of ICERANGE 
 ICERANGE is arguably the most relevant for products or categories with which consumers 
have significant levels of performance- and/or preference-related uncertainty.  Incentive 
compatible approaches such as ICERANGE and BDM require consumers to “put their money 
where their mouth is.”  For the actual purchase to take place, the products, or at least their 
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working prototypes, must be available for sale.  Therefore, for new products still in the design 
and development stage, conjoint analysis and its variants are likely to remain the preferred 
methods.   
 The actual purchase requirement would render ICERANGE and BDM inapplicable to public 
goods and to big ticket items such as cars and homes.  To our knowledge, there is really no good 
approach to assess consumers’ reservation prices for these big ticket items in the pre-purchase 
stage.  This area merits research. 
 We have implemented ICERANGE for a single product.  The meaning of the reservation 
price range when consumers are planning to buy a basket of goods, and the way in which 
ICERANGE should be adapted are significant issues that we have not tackled.   
ICERANGE’s advantage over standard self-explicated approaches lies in its ability to 
enforce incentive compatibility and overcome strategic bias.  Yet the speed and “simplicity” of a 
typical self-explicated approach are difficult to match.  We leave it to a prospective user to weigh 
the relative costs and benefits of these routes. 
A specific limitation with our two applications of ICERANGE is that both are with student 
samples.  This raises the issue of external validity.  As Calder, Phillips, and Tybout (1982) 
observe, it is difficult to establish external validity in any single study.  We therefore urge future 
applications of ICERANGE considering other products and subjects drawn from more diverse 
populations.   
Other Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The ICERANGE approach may be employed to study the impact of uncertainty on 
reservation prices in a variety of contexts.  For example: The effect of dynamic learning (e.g., in 
a new product context) on the range and key supports of the reservation price distribution would 
be of managerial relevance and theoretical interest. 
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While we were able to demonstrate the existence of a positive and significant relationship 
between an individual’s reservation price range and associate levels of uncertainty in the 
chocolate study, our results were inconclusive for the wine study (probably due to a smaller 
sample and possibly greater measurement error on account of the survey-based elicitation).  
While acknowledging this limitation, we encourage additional investigation of the link. 
When a respondent is faced with uncertainty, could s/he provide precise estimates of the 
supports of the range?  We would contend that in the presence of such uncertainty, it would be 
harder for consumers to provide single point estimates of the reservation price under the 
traditional conceptualization.  What our notion of the range does is to offer the consumer some 
“wriggle room” in expressing one’s preference intensity.  We recognize that there are other ways 
to extend our conceptualization; for example, the specific thresholds within the range could 
themselves be treated as fuzzy and modeled as such. 
The two different types of buyer’s uncertainty (knowledge uncertainty and preference 
uncertainty) may impact the reservation price range in different ways.  Studies may be conducted 
involving manipulations of both types of uncertainty to examine the differences in their effect on 
the range as well as the key support points.  On a related note, we urge a more thorough 
investigation on the antecedents of the range in individuals’ reservation prices.  
  
Figure 1 
PROTOCOL USED FOR ALTERNATIVE ELICITATION METHODS 
 
(A)  Protocol for Respondents in the ICERANGE Group 
 
Panel 1: Please reveal a price level A at or below which you would definitely buy the bar of chocolate.  Later, if the price in the 
envelope is found later to be lower than or equal to this price A, you will be required to purchase at the envelope price.  (For example, if 
your indicated price A is $100 and the envelope pri ce is $99, you will be required to purchase the product at $99). Please state your price 
level A below: 
A: __________. 
 
Panel 2: Please reveal a price level B at which you would be indifferent between buying and not buying 
the bar of chocolate. (At this price, you are 50% likely to buy the product.)  Later, if the price in the 
envelope is equal to this price B, you will be asked to pick a ball from an urn containing one green ball 
and one red ball. If you pick the green ball, you will be required to buy at the price from the envelope.  If 
you pick the red ball, you will not be given the opportunity to buy.  (If, however, your price level B is the 
same as your earlier price level A, the higher purchase probability associated with A will apply.)  Please 
state your price level B below: 
B: _________ 
 
Panel 3: Please reveal a price level C at which you are only 10% likely to buy the bar of chocolate. Later, if the price in the sealed 
envelope is equal to this price C, you will be asked to pick a ball from an urn containing one green and nine red balls.  If you pick the 
green ball, you will be required to buy at the price from the envelope. If you pick a red ball, you will not be given the opportunity to buy.  
(If, however, your price level C is the same as your earlier price level A or B, the highest associated purchase probability will apply.)  
Please enter your price level C below: 
C: _________  
 
 
Panel 4: What if the envelope price P falls within the range of price points you have indicated before?  
Price ($) 
Definitely  
Buy  
A 
Price ($) 
Definitely  
Buy  
Definitely  
NOT Buy 
B 
C 
A 
10% Likely 
to Buy 
50% Likely 
to Buy 
Price ($) 
Definitely  
Buy  
B A 
50% Likely 
to Buy 
  
 
· For example, if the envelope price P corresponds to a 60% probability of purchase, you will be 
asked to pick a ball from an urn containing three green balls and two red balls.  
o If you pick a green ball, you will be required to buy at the price in the envelope. 
o If you pick a red ball, you will not be given the opportunity to buy. 
 
(B)  Protocol for Respondents in the BDM Group 
For BDM respondents, there is a single reservation price  elicitation question: 
Please reveal the price level A at or below which you will buy the bar of chocolate. (If the price in the envelope is found later to be lower 
than or equal to this price A, you will be required to purchase at the envelope price.  Otherwise you will not be given the opportunity to 
buy the chocolate.  For example, if your indicated price A is $100 and the envelope price is $99, you will be required to purchase the 
product at $99). Please state your price level A below: 
A: ________ 
(C)  Protocol for Respondents in the Vickrey Auction Group 
Respondents placed a bid for a bar of Galler chocolate after reading the following rules.   
· You gain the most by revealing the maximum price you are willing to pay for the product. 
· All bids are final.  You will not be able to change your bid once the auction is closed.  
· We will collect all bids.  The winner – to be announced in the next class – will be the highest bidder.  
If you are the winner, you will be required to purchase the chocolate at the second highest bid.  For 
example, if your winning bid is $100 and the second highest bid is $99, you will pay $99 and receive 
a bar of chocolate.  Please make your bid below:  
Bid: ________ 
(D)  Protocol for Respondents in the Self Explication Groups 
Respondents were asked one of the following questions (depending on the group): 
For self explication of floor reservation price:  
· Please reveal the maximum price P at or below which you will definitely buy the bar of Galler milk 
chocolate at this moment.    
Price ($) 
A B C 
P 
Price ($) 
0 
50% 
60% 
100% 
10% 
For example, if the 
envelope  price is $P, 
you are 60% likely to 
buy. 
  
P: ________ 
For self explication of indifference reservation price:  
· Please reveal the maximum price P at which you would be indifferent between buying and not buying 
a bar of Galler milk chocolate at this moment.   
P: ________ 
For self explication of general reservation price: 
· Please reveal the maximum price P that you are willing to pay for a bar of Galler milk chocolate at 
this moment.    
P: ________ 
 
  
Table 1 
CHOCOLATE STUDY: RESERVATION PRICE ESTIMATES AND PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
 ICERANGE 
(N = 134) 
BDM 
(N = 128) 
Vickrey Auction 
(N = 104) 
Self Explicated 
(Total N = 196)  
Reservation 
Price Type  
Floor Indifference Ceiling   Floor 
(N = 54) 
Indifference 
(N = 59 ) 
General 
(N = 83) 
Mean [$] 
(Standard Error [$]) 
2.97 
(.14) 
3.48 
(.17) 
4.19 
(.21) 
2.94 
(.15) 
3.14 
(.27) 
2.02 
(.12) 
2.71 
(.42) 
2.39 
(.16) 
Mean Difference [$] 
(Standard Error [$]) 
           .51 1                .70 1 
             (.06)                (.11) 
   
SCL (Shift in Choice 
Likelihood) 
.126 2 .180 .307 .315 .337 .339 
1  Significantly greater than zero (p < .05) 
2  Significantly less than SCL for BDM (p < .10) and for all other methods (p < .05) 
 
  
TABLE 2 
CHOCOLATE STUDY:  RESPONDENTS’ EVALUATION OF METHODS ON KEY DIMENSIONS 
 
Key Dimensions 
(5-point scale: “1” Strongly Disagree; 
“5” Strongly Agree) 
ICERANGE BDM Vickrey 
Auction 
Self 
Explicated 
Floor 
Self 
Explicated 
Indifference 
Self 
Explicated 
General 
(a) Comfort level: I am 
comfortable in answering 
questions in this survey 
4.38 1 4.44 4.32 4.54 4.65 4.51 
(b) Clarity of Incentive 
Compatibility: It is clear to me 
that I would benefit most by 
stating my true reservation price.4 
4.14 2 4.34 3.29 N/A N/A N/A 
(c) Comprehension: The procedure 
is easy to understand.5 
3.85 3 4.39 4.24 4.73 4.53 4.59 
1  Not significantly different from corresponding measures for the other methods 
2  Not significantly different from the BDM measure but significantly higher than the Vickrey auction measure (p < .05)  
3  Significantly less than the corresponding measures for the other methods (p < .05) 
4  Adapted from Wertenbroch and Skiera’s (2002) question “Is it clear why it is in your best interest to state exactly the price you are 
willing to pay?” 
5  Adapted from Wertenbroch and Skiera’s question “Has this procedure been confusing for you?” 
 
 
  
Table 3 
CHOCOLATE STUDY:  MEASURES OF CONSUMER UNCERTAINTY  
Rotated factor loadings 
Measures  
(5-point scale: “1” Strongly Disagree; “5” Strongly 
Agree) 
Factor 1 1 
(Preference 
Uncertainty) 
Factor 2 2 
(Knowledge 
 
Uncertainty) 
U1: I know exactly what kind of chocolate I want to buy   .872 -.033 
U2: I know for sure which attributes of chocolate are 
important to me. 
  .676   .355 
U3: I know exactly how much I would like to pay for the 
chocolate 
  .775   .205 
U4: I consider myself a knowledgeable person on 
chocolate 
  .320   .559 
U5: I felt sure of the quality of the chocolate -.090   .872 
U6: I felt confident about my answers on the survey    .426   .565 
1 Variance explained:  43.2%; coefficient alpha (U1, U2, U3) = .74 
2 Variance explained:  17.9%; coefficient alpha (U4, U5, U6) = .53 
 
 
  
TABLE 4 
WINE STUDY:  RESERVATION PRICE ESTIMATES AND PREDICTIVE 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
 ICERANGE 
(N = 41) 
BDM 
(N = 31) 
Vickrey Auction 
(N = 19) 
Reservation Price Type Floor Indifference Ceiling   
Mean [$] 
(Standard Error [$]) 
11.69 
(1.69) 
13.19 
(1.79) 
16.61 
(2.23) 
12.71 
(1.22) 
11.45 
(1.55) 
Mean Difference [$] 
(Standard Error [$]) 
1.50 1                   3.42 1 
          (.48)                          (.67) 
  
SCL .08 2 .29 .21 
Respondent Feedback Measures   
1.  Comfort level 3.61 3 3.81 4.16 
2.  Clarity of Incentive 
Compatibility 
3.59 3 3.58 3.42 
3.  Comprehension 3.41  4 3.65 4.63 
1  Significantly greater than zero (p < .05) 
2  Significantly less than SCL for BDM (p < .01) and Vickrey Auction (p < .05) 
3  Not significantly different from corresponding measure for BDM and Vickrey auction 
4  Not significantly different from corresponding measure for BDM; significantly less than that 
for Vickrey auction (p < .01) 
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